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Offloading memory to external stores (e.g., a saved file) allows us to evade the 
limitations of our internal memory. One cost of this strategy is that the external memory store 
used may be accessible to others and, thus, may be manipulated. Here we examine how reducing 
the perceived reliability of an external memory store and manipulating one’s expectation for 
future access to such a store can influence participants’ susceptibility to its manipulation (i.e., 
endorsing manipulated information as authentic). Across three pre-registered experiments, 
participants were able to store to-be-remembered information in an external store. On a critical 
trial, we surreptitiously manipulated the information in that store. Results demonstrated that an 
explicit notification of a previous manipulation of that store and the warning that the store will be 
inaccessible in the future can decrease susceptibility to manipulation of that store. Results are 
discussed in the context of the metacognitive monitoring and control of memory reports in 
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[A version of Chapter 1 has been submitted to Memory (Pereira et al., 2021).]  
Individuals are often presented with to-be-remembered information that is critical for 
accomplishing their future goals. Given that the ability to store and retrieve accurate information 
from internal/biological memory is limited, this can cause problems when what we wish to 
remember exceeds what we may be capable of accurately remembering (Cowan, 2010). As such, 
it is often easier and/or more beneficial to rely on external storage devices rather than to rely on 
our internal/biological memory (Eskritt & Ma, 2014; Hutchins, 1995; Kelly & Risko, 2019a; Lu 
et al., 2020; Sparrow et al., 2011). In this digital age, the amount of information that can be 
stored externally (e.g., in cyberspace) is virtually limitless and is usually readily accessible.  
The use of external memory storage in place of internal memory storage can be thought 
of as a form of cognitive offloading (Risko & Gilbert, 2016). While offloading memory demands 
in this manner grants individuals the benefit of having an extended memory system with a vast 
capacity, there are risks associated with taking such an approach to “remembering” (Ferguson et 
al., 2015; Kelly & Risko, 2019a; Lu et al., 2020; Sparrow et al., 2011). One risk is that the 
external store can be manipulated by others (Clark, 2010b; Sterelny, 2004) unbeknownst to us. 
This is particularly problematic when our external memory stores are in places accessible via the 
Internet (e.g., personal information stored “in the cloud”) and thus, in principle, accessible by 
others. While the deliberate manipulation of one’s external store may not be the most pervasive 
(practical) issue when utilizing external memory stores, how individuals respond to such 
manipulations could provide novel insights into how we manage information retrieval in a 







Endorsement of information 
When retrieving from an external memory store (e.g., a file stored in the cloud, a 
notebook), one must decide whether to endorse the information in the external store as that 
which had originally been stored there (i.e., the endorsement problem; Arango-Muñoz, 2013). In 
a series of experiments examining this general problem, Risko et al. (2019) focused on the 
individual’s susceptibility to manipulation of their external memory stores. They presented 
participants with to-be-remembered words and instructed them to save the presented information 
to a computer file that they could access during a subsequent recall test. Doing so provided the 
participants the opportunity to offload the memory demands to the external store. Unsurprisingly, 
this allowed near-perfect “recall” of the stored information at test. After repeating this procedure 
across multiple trials, on the final trial (of critical interest), the researchers manipulated the 
information in the participant’s external memory store by inserting a novel word into it. 
Individuals often failed to notice this manipulation, with most recalling the inserted information 
as if it had been initially presented. Importantly, endorsement was not absolute; that is, 
individuals did not appear to merely trust their external store uncritically. How, then, do 
individuals decide whether to endorse the information in their external memory stores?  
A useful means of framing this question theoretically is to think of the endorsement 
problem from a metacognitive perspective (Arango-Muñoz, 2013). For example, Koriat and 
Goldsmith (1996) discuss a metacognitive framework for understanding memory reports in the 
context of situations where individuals must decide whether to volunteer an answer to a query 
(e.g., the answer to a trivia question). According to Koriat and Goldsmith (1996), this decision 
combines information from (1) a monitoring process that provides a subjective sense of the likely 






demands and ultimately decides whether the answer will be reported. The endorsement problem 
can be seen as a similar kind of problem, as an individual must decide whether to endorse (i.e., 
report) information from their external store as being the information stored there initially. Thus, 
we can imagine that similar monitoring and control mechanisms are at play here. For example, 
when we encounter information in our external memory stores, it likely comes with a feeling of 
familiarity. In addition, we also have a history of external memory store use, both in general and 
with the particular external store in question, and face various demands associated with that 
retrieval (e.g., a need for accuracy versus speed). From this theoretical perspective, what seems 
clear is the need to better understand what factors are considered in the face of such an 
endorsement problem and how they come to influence the endorsement of information in 
external memory stores.  
In the present investigation, we pursue this broad question through an examination of the 
influence of two manipulations on the endorsement of information inserted into an individual’s 
external memory store—the perceived reliability of the external memory store and the expected 
access to that external store during a future test of memory. How reliable an individual considers 
a given external memory store to be is likely to play an important role in whether an individual 
endorses information stored within it (Lewandowsky et al., 2000; Muir & Moray, 1996; Storm & 
Stone, 2015; Weis & Weise, 2019). Research consistent with this idea has demonstrated that 
reliability is related to the individual’s reliance on external aids to perform cognitive tasks.  
Weis and Wiese (2019) examined the effect of actual and believed reliability on an 
individual’s decision to offload task demands in a mental rotation task. In this task, participants 
had the option to rotate the stimuli either internally (mentally) or externally, with a rotation knob 






altering participants’ beliefs about the knob’s reliability (believed reliability) were manipulated, 
and the frequency of cognitive offloading (i.e., the use of the knob) and perceived knob 
utility were measured. They found that participants adjusted their offloading based on the actual 
and believed reliability of the knob. When participants experienced a decrease in the knob’s 
actual reliability or were led to believe that the knob’s reliability was lower than it actually was, 
participants reduced their use of the external rotation option.  
In the context of offloading memory demands, Storm and Stone (2015) provided 
evidence that the reliability of an external memory store modulated the benefit of offloading. 
Across three experiments, Storm and Stone (2015) demonstrated that when participants believed 
(at study) that a file containing a list of to-be-remembered words would be saved and accessible 
at the time of test, there was a benefit to the recall of an intervening list that was not saved. The 
authors proposed that offloading the initial list reduced proactive interference on the subsequent 
list. Particularly relevant to the present effort, this benefit of offloading was not observed when 
the external memory store was considered unreliable. Unreliability in this case was manipulated 
by participants experiencing an ineffective saving process. Storm and Stone (2015) suggested 
that when the external memory store was perceived as unreliable, individuals were less likely to 
offload their memory to that store (despite it being available), thus reducing the benefit to the 
subsequent list.  
The Storm and Stone (2015) explanation highlights two ideas central to the present 
investigation. First, reducing the perceived reliability of an external store can reduce reliance on 
it. If we view accepting information inserted into an external store as an issue related to too much 
reliance on that store, then reducing the external store’s perceived reliability should reduce 






information in an external store, if an individual does not believe that external memory store to 
be reliable, then they might not offload memory to that store, instead opting to store that 
information internally. We examine next how offloading or not at study might influence 
susceptibility to external store manipulation. 
The notion that offloading during study might influence later susceptibility to external 
store manipulation was raised in the original work investigating this issue. Risko and colleagues 
(2019) argued that one potential reason that participants often accepted an item inserted into their 
external memory stores was that their expectation of having access to that external store during 
initial study led to poor encoding of the actually presented information. For example, in research 
investigating cognitive offloading, participants who expect to have access to an external memory 
store at recall (i.e., those that can offload the memory demands), recall less than those who do 
not expect to have access to an external store (i.e., those that cannot offload memory demands; 
Kelly & Risko 2019a; 2019b; Lu et al., 2020). This might reflect individuals forgoing efforts to 
internally store information when they can rely on it being available externally. Returning to the 
individual’s susceptibility to external store manipulation, a poor internal representation for 
information that was actually presented (i.e., legitimate information) would presumably make it 
more difficult to differentiate it from inserted items (i.e., illegitimate information). This can be 
thought of as a basic signal detection problem wherein poor encoding, due to an expectation of 
future access to the external memory store, leads to greater overlap in the distributions of 
memory strength/familiarity and as a result, a reduced ability to distinguish actually presented 
from unpresented items.  
Another route through which encoding activities might influence susceptibility to 






memory. For example, Scoroboria and colleagues (2007) found that they could enhance people’s 
belief in a childhood event (i.e., a belief that an event occurred regardless of an accompanying 
memory), by providing participants with both high prevalence information (e.g., “this event is 
common”) and a rationale for the common experience of forgetting past events. That is, when 
participants are instructed that the likelihood of an event is high and that forgetting often occurs, 
they are more likely to increase their belief that an event happened to them. In the context of 
external memory stores, if participants encoded the information poorly, they may not expect 
items in their external memory store to be associated with an experience of remembering (e.g., a 
feeling of familiarity). Consequently, the lack of such experience when they encounter an 
inserted item in their external store would not itself set off any proverbial alarm bells. This might 
make it difficult, again, to tell legitimate from illegitimate information.  
In a similar vein, endorsing an item inserted into an external store might be similar to 
endorsing a critical lure in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm which appears to 
be sensitive to knowledge about the effect (Gallo et al., 1997; McDermott & Roediger, 1998; 
Neuschatz, et al., 2003; Watson et al., 2004; Watson et al., 2005). In this paradigm participants 
study a list of typically semantically related words (e.g., bed, rest, wake) and during a subsequent 
memory test, they show high rates of false retrieval for a semantically related but unpresented 
word (e.g., sleep; Payne et al., 1996; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). If participants were warned 
about the nature of the DRM lists, they were typically presented an example list (e.g., bed, rest, 
wake) and forewarned that it was designed to elicit false memories for an unpresented critical 
word (e.g., sleep), which was then identified to the participant. For the forthcoming DRM lists, 
the likelihood that the unpresented word is falsely retrieved is reduced if participants were 






knowledge about the plausibility of an item being inserted into their external store might 
influence their willingness to endorse a suspect item (e.g., an item that does not feel familiar). 
Present Investigation 
In the present investigation, we examined both the perceived reliability of the external 
memory store and encoding conditions as two possible factors influencing endorsement of 
information inserted into an external memory store. In Experiment 1, we extended previous work 
which examined individuals’ susceptibility to endorsing information that has been surreptitiously 
inserted into their external memory store (Risko et al., 2019). In Experiment 2, we compared this 
susceptibility in a condition wherein individuals were made “naïve” to the insertion, as in the 
work by Risko et al. (2019), to a condition in which individuals were informed that we had 
previously manipulated their external memory store. Lastly, in Experiment 3, we sought to 
investigate how differences in expected future access to an external memory store (i.e., the 
opportunity to offload) influenced susceptibility to insertion (Kelly & Risko 2019a; 2019b; Lu et 
al., 2020). 
The reported experiments followed the same general procedure as that of Risko et al. 
(2019). On each trial, participants were shown a list of to-be-remembered words, one a time, and 
had to type them into a computer file that they were instructed would be available during test 
(which was always the case). Participants then completed a simple arithmetic distractor task. 
During the recognition test in Experiment 1 or the recall test in Experiments 2 and 3, participants 
were given access to their saved file to consult if desired. The procedure was the same for the 
first three trials, to develop a sense of trust in and familiarity with the external memory store. On 
the fourth trial, the researcher surreptitiously inserted a word in the middle position of the 






participants completed the distractor task). Participants then completed their recognition/recall 
test on the fourth trial. In Experiments 1 and 2, diverging from Risko and colleagues (2019) in 
which the task ended after this fourth trial, we explicitly notified participants that this 
manipulation of their external memory store had taken place. Critically, participants then 
completed a fifth trial, similar to the fourth trial. That is, we again inserted an item in the middle 
position of the participant’s external memory store while they performed the distractor task 
between the encoding task and recognition/recall test. Thus, this fifth trial took place when 
participants knew that the reliability of their external store was compromised. In Experiment 3, 
after the third trial, we warned half of the participants that their external store would not be 
available at test, although they were still to type the words at study/encoding.  
The critical question is whether individuals endorse the inserted item as having been 
presented during encoding and, further, whether the likelihood of this endorsement differs 
following being apprised of the external memory store’s vulnerability to manipulation 
(Experiments 1 & 2) or future inaccessibility (Experiment 3). Based on previous research (Storm 
& Stone, 2015; Weis & Weise, 2019), we predicted that when participants are told that their 
external memory store could be manipulated or that it will be inaccessible, they should be less 
susceptible to a manipulation of their external store. Also of interest is the form that this putative 
decrease in susceptibility might take. For example, this reduced susceptibility might emerge as a 
decrease in endorsement for all items (e.g., a kind of general skepticism or bias against the 
external store) or a more specific increase in the likelihood that the inserted item is detected as 
such (e.g., increased sensitivity). In addition to endorsement, we also assessed participants’ 
ability to pick out the inserted item on the last trial, and self-reports of strategies employed (from 







In Experiment 1 (preregistered at https://osf.io/cm9fq), participants performed the tasks 
described above. The retrieval test was a modified recognition test wherein participants were 
presented with each study word (i.e., originally presented during encoding), and, on Trials 4 and 
5, the inserted item as well—the only foil. After Trial 4, participants were told about the 
insertion of the item into their external store (i.e., their typed list) and asked whether they 
noticed. After Trial 5, participants were first asked about the offloading strategy that they 
employed wherein they rated on a scale from 1–5 the extent to which they relied on their typed 
list (i.e., the external store) versus their internal memory. Participants were then asked whether 
they noticed if a word was inserted on Trial 5 and finally, asked to select a word from their 
external memory store (i.e., list) that they thought was most likely to have been inserted. Data 
and materials for Experiment 1 are available at https://osf.io/xzw4t/. 
Method 
Participants  
Data from 32 participants were collected based on an a priori power analysis with the 
desired power of .80 (α = .05, two-tailed) to detect a medium sized effect in participants’ 
confidence in the inserted word from Trial 4 to Trial 5 (see Confidence below for details). 
Participants were undergraduate psychology students at the University of Waterloo participating 
for course credit. Data from two participants were replaced due to incomplete data. 
Apparatus 
Both the participant and researcher were seated in the same room with a divider 
separating their workstations. At the participant’s workstation were two computers and two 






and save their typed lists (workspace monitor). These monitors were connected to the computers 
and monitors at the researcher’s workstation to remotely control them and to observe the 
participant’s progression through the experiment (this was not made explicit to the participants, 
however). At the researcher’s workstation were three computers with three corresponding 
monitors displaying each of the two monitors from the participant’s workstation; and one was 
used to covertly access the participant’s list and to insert a word when required. 
Stimuli  
Five lists were created using the SenticNet 4 word corpus (Cambria, Poria, Bajpai, & 
Schuller, 2016). The lists were counterbalanced across trial position. The word lists varied in 
lengths (i.e., 15, 17, 19, 21, 23) so that when participants progressed to the insertion trials (Trials 
4 and 5), a one-word insertion would not be easily detectable by counting. The inserted words 
were yoked to specific word lists, such that each list had the same designated word as the 
inserted word (see Appendix for the word lists). Whenever a list was presented on Trials 4 or 5, 
the designated inserted word for that list was inserted in the middle position of the list. The word 
lists presented for the non-manipulated trials (Trials 1-3) did not include its yoked inserted word, 
and thus, list lengths were 14, 16, 18, 20, and 22. In the analysis, the inserted item was compared 
to a control item, which was the word presented directly before it, or in rare cases where that 
item was not stored, its preceding item was used as the control. The control item was chosen to 
be the immediately preceding item to approximately control for serial position and to avoid the 
item following the inserted item. The latter could be problematic if participants notice the 
inserted item. Within and between each word list (including the inserted words), words were not 
meaningfully different in length or frequency, with median word lengths of 6 to 7 letters and 






Brysbaert & New, 2009). At encoding, words were presented visually in the center of the screen 
in Arial font and each word was presented for 5 s with a 1-s interstimulus interval.  
Post-Trial 4 notification question  
After completing the recognition test for the first word-insertion trial (Trial 4), 
participants responded to a question which asked, “During the arithmetic task, we typed 
“[inserted word]” into your text file. Did you notice?” 
Post-task questionnaire  
Upon the completion of the second word-insertion trial, Trial 5, participants were asked 
three questions specific to that final trial. Question 1 asked, “Please select the option that best 
describes your recognition strategy during the final (fifth) trial of this study.” Participants had six 
options to choose from, including: (a) I relied exclusively on my typed list during the recognition 
test, (b) I relied mostly on my typed list during the recognition test, (c) I relied about equally on 
both my list and my internal memory during the recognition test, (d) I relied mostly on my 
internal memory during the recognition test, (e) I relied exclusively on my internal memory 
during the recognition test, and (f) None of the above. Question 2 asked, “On the last trial we 
may have added a word to your typed list that was not presented originally. Please respond yes or 
no as to whether you believe we inserted a word into your list on your final trial.” Question 3 
stated, “Please open up your last list. Please review this list and type out a word you think was 
inserted. Even if you don’t think something was added, please guess.” Participants were shown 
their final manipulated list to refer to for Question 3.  
Procedure  
Participants were seated at their workstation, approximately 50 cm in front of two 






which one word at a time was presented in white on a grey background. As each word was 
presented on the right display monitor, participants simultaneously typed each word into a text 
file on the left workspace monitor. On the rare occasion that a participant missed writing a word, 
they would not have the opportunity for it to be presented again. After the encoding task was 
complete, participants were asked to save their ‘.txt’ file on the left workspace monitor. With 
their saved list now closed, participants completed a 30-s arithmetic distractor task on the right 
display monitor, which asked them to answer ‘true’ or ‘false’ to simple arithmetic equations. 
After the distractor task, participants were instructed to open their ‘.txt’ file on the 
workspace monitor and to complete a recognition test on the display monitor, using the list as an 
aid if they chose to. During each recognition test, participants were asked to provide a 
confidence rating for each word one at a time, corresponding to whether they believed each word 
in the recognition test was presented during the encoding task. For each word, participants 
provided a confidence rating of (1) definitely not presented during encoding, (2) probably not 
presented during encoding, (3) probably presented during encoding, or (4) definitely presented 
during encoding. There was no time limit. Three trials were completed in this manner. No items 
were inserted on Trials 1-3, thus, all the words presented in the recognition test were targets.  
Critically, on the fourth trial, while participants were completing the arithmetic distractor task, 
the researcher used one of the monitors at their workstations to covertly access the participant’s 
saved, closed list, and to insert a word into the middle position of that list. This took place 
undisclosed to participants, and their display monitor did not change while the researcher altered 
the contents of the file it held. When opening their saved list for the recognition test, participants 
unknowingly accessed this now manipulated list. Participants then performed the recognition test 






participants answered the Post-Trial 4 notification question, the wording of which informed them 
that their external memory store was vulnerable to manipulation. Participants then completed the 
fifth (final) trial which included the same insertion manipulation as Trial 4. Participants 
subsequently answered Questions 1, 2, and 3 from the Post-task questionnaire. To conclude, the 
researchers debriefed the participants about the true purpose of the study and reason for 
deception. 
Results 
Descriptive data from Experiment 1 are available in Table 1. All mixed-effects models 
reported throughout were conducted using the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2015). Interactions 
among the fixed factors were also included in the model when appropriate—as indicated in the 
preregistered analyses. We included intercepts for participant as a random effect unless 
otherwise specified. In the case that models resulted in singular fits, this factor was removed. 
When an interaction term is not significant, we report results with and without it in the model. As 
described earlier, responses to the inserted item were compared to a control item (an actually 
presented item), which was the word presented directly before the inserted item was placed, or in 
rare cases where that item was not encoded, the control item was directly preceding that item. 








Experiment 1: Means (SDs) of all Dependent Variables  






Control confidence 3.97 (0.26) 3.95 (0.38) 3.99 (0.16) 4.00 (0.00) 3.94 (0.25) 
Inserted confidence - - - 3.78 (0.75) 3.16 (1.27) 
Control endorsement .99 (0.08) .98 (0.13) .99 (0.06) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 
Inserted endorsement - - - .94 (0.25) .72 (0.46) 
Notification question - - - .19 - 
Strategy - - - - 3.16 (1.02) 
Think inserted - - - - .66 
Guess accuracy - - - - .34 
Note. Dependent variables (Confidence, Endorsement, Post-Trial 4 notification question, Post-
task questions 1-3; Strategy, Think inserted, Guess accuracy) are reported across the various 
conditions in Experiment 1. For Trials 1-3, the control confidence and endorsement are mean 
values for all encoded items. For Trials 4-5, the control confidence and endorsement are means 
of the one control item. 
Endorsement  
Endorsement was calculated by dichotomizing confidence responses. If participants 
responded “1” or “2” (i.e., definitely or probably not presented during encoding), this was 
considered a “no” response (i.e., not endorsed), whereas if they responded “3” or “4” (probably 
or definitely presented during encoding), this was considered a “yes” response (i.e., endorsed).  
As can be seen in Figure 1, mean endorsement on Trials 4 and 5 were both 1.00 for the 
control items; for inserted items, they were .94 and .72 respectively. We analyzed the effect of 
notifying participants of the unreliability of their external memory store by comparing responses 
on Trial 4 and Trial 5 on endorsement for each item type (inserted vs. control) using separate 
McNemar’s Chi-squared tests with a continuity correction. There was a statistically significant 






such that the inserted item was endorsed more on Trial 4 than Trial 5. Because participants 
endorsed the control item 100% of the time on both Trials 4 and 5, no statistical analysis is 
reported.  
We also analyzed the effect of item type (inserted vs. control) on endorsement separately 
for each trial (Trial 4 vs. Trial 5) using the same statistical test. There was no statistically 
significant difference in the endorsement of control and inserted items on Trial 4, χ2(1) = 0.50, p 
= .480, but there was on Trial 5, such that inserted items were endorsed significantly less often 
than control items, χ2(1) = 7.00, p = .008. We preregistered a mixed-effects logistic regression to 
test the interaction between the effects of item type (inserted vs. control) and trial (Trial 4 vs. 
Trial 5) on endorsement with random intercepts for participant, however, this model failed to 








Experiment 1: Mean Percentage of Endorsement for Control and Inserted Items across Trials 4 
and 5 
 
Note. Error bars are bias-corrected accelerated bootstrap 95% confidence intervals using 10,000 
replications. There are no error bars for the control items, as they were 100% endorsed. 
Confidence 
We also analyzed confidence ratings as a continuous variable (using the entire 1-4 scale). 
In Table 2, the confidence scale is presented with the proportion of participants reporting each 
rating (1, 2, 3, or 4) for the inserted and control items in Trials 4 and 5. An exploratory within-
subject Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was conducted to examine the effects of trial (Trial 4 vs. 
Trial 5) and item type (inserted vs. control) on confidence ratings. The results revealed main 
effects of trial, F(1, 31) = 9.59, p = .004, ƞG2 = .052, and of item type, F(1, 31) = 12.40, p = .001, 
ƞG2 = .103, and a significant interaction between trial and item type, F(1, 31) = 5.07, p = .003, 






significantly higher on Trial 4 (M = 3.78, SD = 0.75) than on Trial 5 (M = 3.16, SD = 1.27), t(31) 
= 2.69, p = .011, d = 0.48. For control items, there was no significant difference in the 
confidence ratings between Trial 4 (M = 4.00, SD = 0) and Trial 5 (M = 3.94, SD = .25), t(31) = 
1.44, p = .161, d = 0.25. When analyzing the effect of item type separately for Trials 4 and 5, 
there was no significant difference in the confidence ratings for control (M = 4.00, SD = 0) and 
inserted (M = 3.78, SD = 0.75) items on Trial 4; t(31) = 1.65 , p = .109, d = 0.29. On Trial 5, 
confidence was significantly lower for inserted items (M = 3.16, SD = 1.27) than for control 
items (M = 3.94, SD = 0.25), t(31) = 3.37, p = .002, d = 0.59. A mixed effects regression with 
random intercepts for participant was conducted to examine the interaction between effects of 
trial (Trial 4 vs. Trial 5) and item type (inserted vs. control) on confidence ratings and revealed 
the interaction to be significant, b = -0.56, SE = 0.25, t = -2.22, p = .029.  
Table 2 
Experiment 1: Proportions of Confidence Ratings (1, 2, 3, or 4) for Control and Inserted Items 
on Trials 4 and 5 
  Rating 
Trial Item 1 2 3 4 
4 
Control 0 0 0 1 
Inserted 0.06 0 0.03 0.91 
5 
Control 0 0 0.06 0.94 
Inserted 0.22 0.06 0.06 0.66 
 
Post-task questionnaire  
For means of responses to the Post-Trial 4 notification question and Post-task Questions 
1 (strategy; 0: completely external - 5: completely internal), 2 (think inserted; 0: no; 1: yes), and 
3 (guess accuracy; 0: incorrect guess; 1: correct guess), see Table 1. In a series of regressions, we 






the inserted item on Trial 5 (logistic regression), their confidence (1-4) for the inserted item on 
Trial 5 (linear regression), whether they thought a word had been inserted on Trial 5 (logistic 
regression), and whether they correctly selected the inserted word on Trial 5 when asked (logistic 
regression). The overall mean self-reported strategy at retrieval was rated 3.16 (SD = 1.02) on a 
scale from 1 (exclusive reliance on the external list) to 5 (exclusive reliance on internal memory). 
Strategy was not a significant predictor of endorsement of the inserted item, b = -0.92, SE = 0.54, 
z = -1.68, p = .092, but did predict confidence, b = -0.46, SE = 0.21, t = -2.16, p = .039, such that 
the more external the recognition strategy reported, the higher the confidence rating for the 
inserted item. Strategy did not predict whether participants thought a word was inserted on Trial 
5, b = -0.51, SE = 0.38, z = 1.34, p = .180, or whether they accurately guessed the inserted word, 
b = 0.69, SE = 0.46, z = 1.52, p = .129. These relations should be considered with caution in light 
of the small sample size in Experiment 1.  
Discussion 
Consistent with previous research, participants often failed to notice a word inserted into 
their external memory stores. Indeed, on Trial 4, 94% of participants responded “yes” (i.e., a 3 or 
4 on the confidence scale) that the inserted item had been presented and they were highly 
confident in their endorsement (3.78 on a 4-point scale). Critically, both endorsement and 
confidence decreased on Trial 5, after participants were told that we had previously manipulated 
their external memory store, though both endorsement rate (72%) and confidence rating (3.16) 
remained high. The notice in between Trials 4 and 5 appeared to have no substantive effect on 
the control item (i.e., the item that was actually presented). This is consistent with the notion that 
any effect of the notice primarily led to increased ability to discern the inserted item (i.e., foil) 






contents. The strategy report results were mixed, but there was some limited evidence that a self-
reported reliance on the external memory store was related to a higher confidence rating for the 
inserted item. 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2 (pre-registered at https://osf.io/3v7j2), we sought a conceptual 
replication of Experiment 1 using a modified recall test rather than a recognition test. One 
potential issue with using a recognition test is that participants can respond “yes” to the inserted 
item for reasons other than the presence of the inserted item in the external memory store. For 
example, individuals might have simply got into the habit of responding with a confidence rating 
of “4” (definitely presented during encoding) to all of the items, provided that almost all of the 
items (except the inserted item) were presented during the encoding phase. A free recall test does 
not suffer from this limitation. For this recall test, participants were provided with a text box in 
which they typed all of the words that had been presented on that trial. As in Experiment 1, 
during the recall test, participants could consult their saved lists (i.e., their external memory 
stores). Thus, the act of “recalling” the inserted word (i.e., typing it into the response box) would 
be unlikely, unless participants were actively endorsing the information in the external memory 
store.  
In Experiment 2, we continued to collect confidence ratings, but given the change in 
memory test, these ratings took on a different meaning. That is, participants were asked to 
provide confidence ratings for all of the items they recalled. We again used a four-point scale but 
here each point corresponded to a percentage range of confidence that the item had been 
presented starting at above 50% (1: 51-60%; 2: 61-75%; 3: 76-94%; 4:95-100%). In addition to 






receive notice of the insertion after Trial 4. Lastly, we collected a much larger sample than in 
Experiment 1 to increase power, and participants completed the study online, thus minor 
procedural changes from Experiment 1 were made to accommodate the online platform. Data 
and materials for Experiment 2 are available at https://osf.io/xzw4t/. 
Method 
Participants 
160 participants were included in the study and recruited online (during the Covid-19 
pandemic) using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and completed the study within one hour for $9.00 
USD. All participants were over the age of eighteen. One participant was replaced due to 
incomplete data and sixty participants were replaced based on preregistered exclusion criteria 
(see below for details). The number of usable participants collected was based on increasing 
power from an unpublished recall experiment (https://osf.io/wk62f) to better detect critical 
interactions between notice and item type. Compared to Experiment 1, we roughly doubled our 
sample size for each condition present in Experiment 2.  
Materials  
The Stimuli and Post-Trial 4 notification question used were the same as in Experiment 1. 
Confidence measure 
Beside each word that they typed (“recalled”), participants were asked to provide a 
confidence rating corresponding to how much they believed it was presented to them in the 
encoding task. For each word that they recalled, participants provided a confidence rating of (1) 
possibly presented originally (i.e., between 51% and 60% chance it was presented), (2) 
moderately likely presented originally (i.e., between 61% and 75% chance it was presented), (3) 






definitely presented originally (i.e., between 95% and 100% chance it was presented). There was 
a 5-min time limit for the recall test before the program automatically proceeded to the next task. 
Post-task questionnaire  
Upon completion of the second word-insertion trial, Trial 5, participants were asked three 
questions specific to that final trial. Question 1 asked, “Please select the option that best 
describes your recall strategy during the final (fifth) trial of this study.” Participants had six 
options to choose from, including: (a) I relied exclusively on my typed list during the recall test, 
(b) I relied mostly on my typed list during the recall test, (c) I relied about equally on both my 
list and my internal memory during the recall test, (d) I relied mostly on my internal memory 
during the recall test, (e) I relied exclusively on my internal memory during the recall test, and 
(f) None of the above. Question 2 asked, “On the last trial we may have added a word to your 
typed list that was not presented originally. Please respond yes or no as to whether you believe 
we inserted a word into your list on your final trial.” Question 3 stated, “Please open up your last 
list. Please review this list and type out a word you think was inserted. Even if you don’t think 
something was added, please guess.” Participants were shown their final manipulated list to refer 
to for Question 3.  
Debriefing questionnaire  
Not to be confused with the Post-task questionnaire, we administered a debriefing 
questionnaire to help ensure data quality from online collection. Specifically, at the end of the 
experiment, participants were asked three questions that we used to exclude participants. 
Question 1 asked, “Did you take any notes or write anything down while completing the task?” 
Question 2 asked, “Were you doing anything else while completing this task? (e.g., Netflix).” 






Question 3 asked, “Is there any reason we should or should not use your data? (It's okay if you 
think you weren't able to give it your best, just let us know).” The options of “feel free to use my 
data” and “don't use my data" were provided in multiple-choice format.  
Procedure 
Each trial began with an encoding task, in which one word at a time was presented in 
blue on a white background. Participants were told to type each word as it appeared in exactly 
the way it was presented. As each word was presented in the middle of the screen, participants 
had 6 seconds to type the word in a text box below it to “save it” on a list (counterbalanced to 
populate on the left or right side of the screen, at the participant level). After 6 s, participants 
were presented with the next word and their previously typed word was added to the list. This list 
was presented on the right or left side of the screen under the title “saved list.” No special 
characters, numbers, or capitalizations that the participant typed would be translated to their 
saved list. If on the rare occasion participants missed writing a word, then they would not have 
the opportunity for it to be presented again and it would not be added to their saved list. After the 
encoding task was complete, participants had an opportunity to view their list for 10 s before it 
disappeared, and they moved on to the 30-s arithmetic distractor task, which had a time limit of 
10 s per question.  
After the distractor task, participants completed the recall test, during which they were 
presented with their saved list on the same side of the screen as it had been presented during 
encoding. In the middle of the screen, there was a text box and participants were instructed to 
only type (“recall”) words that they thought were presented during the encoding task along with 
a confidence rating, using their saved list as an aid if they chose to. Participants were advised 






the text box. Three trials were completed in this way. On the fourth trial, when presented with 
their saved list at recall, it was presented with the inserted word halfway into their typed list, 
undisclosed to participants. Once participants completed the recall test for Trial 4, those in the 
notice condition were asked the Post-Trial 4 notification question, the wording of which 
informed them that their external memory store was vulnerable to manipulation. Those in the no-
notice condition moved on to Trial 5 without any notice. Afterward, all participants completed 
the fifth and final trial, including the same manipulation as Trial 4. Participants subsequently 
answered Questions 1, 2, and 3 from the Post-task questionnaire, completed the debriefing 
questionnaire, and were debriefed on the true purpose of the study and the reason for deception. 
Results 
Descriptive data from Experiment 2 are presented in Table 3. Average confidence ratings 
reported are based only on items that were recalled. The single control item to be compared to 
the single inserted item was decided in the same manner as Experiment 1. 60 participants were 
replaced based on not meeting any of the following preregistered criteria: (1) typing the word 
before the inserted word (used as the control) or the word before that, (2) typing at least 90% of 
the words they were supposed to on Trials 4 and 5 (the instruction was to write down 100% of 
the words), (3) accurately answering over 70% on the simple math problems during the 
arithmetic distractor task, (4) providing a confidence rating of 1-4, as instructed, to any recalled 
word (since our DVs include the confidence of that recalled item, but we are not able to infer it 
from no confidence rating or a rating outside of the range). In the debriefing questionnaire at the 
end of the experiment, participants were excluded from all analyses if they answered yes to any 
of the following: (1) doing something other than the task, (2) writing/screenshotting any words 






effects models reported throughout were conducted in the same manner as outlined in 
Experiment 1.  
Table 3 















Control confidence 3.28 (1.12) 3.95 (0.23) 3.85 (0.39) 3.85 (0.46) 3.78 (0.56) 
Inserted confidence - - - 3.52 (0.97) 3.03 (1.24) 
Control recall 0.95 (0.22) 0.99 (0.11) 0.99 (0.07) 0.93 (0.27) 0.90 (0.30) 
Inserted recall - - - 0.78 (0.42) 0.41 (0.50) 
Notification question - - - 0.40 - 
Strategy - - - - 3.78 
Think inserted - - - - 0.78 






Control confidence 3.75 (0.79) 3.80 (0.66) 3.72 (0.82) 3.81 (0.63) 3.77 (0.71) 
Inserted confidence - - - 3.46 (1.06) 3.65 (0.85) 
Control recall 0.78 (0.41) 0.84 (0.37) 0.97 (0.18) 0.94 (0.24) 0.88 (0.33) 
Inserted recall - - - 0.65 (0.48) 0.58 (0.50) 
Notification question - - - - - 
Strategy - - - - 3.84 
Think inserted - - - - 0.55 
Guess accuracy - - - - 0.41 
Note. Experiment 2: Dependent variables (Confidence, Recall, Post-Trial 4 notification, Post-
task question answers 1-3; Strategy, Think inserted, Guess accuracy) are reported across the 
various conditions. For Trials 1-3, the control confidence and recall are mean values for all 
encoded items. For Trials 4-5, the control confidence and recall are means of the one control 
item. 
Recall  
The mean proportions of items recalled as a function of condition (no-notice and notice) 
and item type (control vs. inserted) are presented in Figure 2. A mixed effects logistic regression 
with the predictors notice condition (no-notice vs. notice), trial (Trial 4 and 5), and item type 






Two separate regressions revealed a significant interaction between trial and item type in the 
notice condition, b = -2.25, SE = 0.86, z = -2.62, p = .009, but not in the no-notice condition, b = 
0.55, SE = 0.86, z = 0.64, p = .520. When the interaction term in the latter model was removed, 
participants were significantly more likely to recall items on Trial 4 than on Trial 5, b = -0.82, SE 
= 0.40, z = -2.06, p = .039, and significantly more likely to recall the control item than the 
inserted item, b = -3.50, SE = 0.60, z = -5.78, p < .001.  We next performed separate regressions 
on the inserted and control items in the notice condition. In the notice condition, for inserted 
items, recall was significantly higher on Trial 4 compared with Trial 5, b = -2.17, SE = 0.55, z = -
3.92, p < .001. No significant difference was revealed for control items, b = -1.17, SE = 1.16, z = 
-1.01, p = .310.  
As is clear in Figure 2, on Trial 4 there seems to be a difference in individual’s 
recollection of the inserted item, which is unexpected since these conditions do not differ until 
after Trial 4, when the notification takes place. To assess whether the recollection of inserted 
items on Trial 4 differed by condition, we performed an exploratory regression (i.e., not 
preregistered), which was a logistic regression since there was no within-subject factor. For 
inserted items in Trial 4, no significant difference was revealed for condition, b = 0.62, SE = 
0.36, z = 1.74, p = .083. To assess whether the recollection of inserted items on Trial 5 differed 
by condition, we again performed an exploratory regression, which revealed that for inserted 
items in Trial 5, items in the notification condition were recalled significantly less than those in 
the no-notification condition, b = -0.66, SE = 0.32, z = -2.05, p = .041. Notably, while recall of 
the inserted item did reduce (in Trial 5) after the explicit notification that we had inserted an item 








Experiment 2: Mean Percentage of Recall for Control and Inserted Items across Trials 4 And 5 
for Both Notice Conditions 
 
Note. Error bars are bias-corrected accelerated bootstrap 95% confidence intervals using 10,000 
replications. 
Confidence  
In Table 4, the confidence scale is presented with the proportion of participants reporting 
each rating (1, 2, 3, or 4) for the inserted and control items in the last trial (Trial 5). For the 
following analyses, confidence was treated as a continuous variable. A mixed effects regression 
including notice condition (no-notice vs. notice), trial (Trial 4 and 5), and item type (inserted vs. 
control), revealed a three-way interaction, b = -0.67, SE = 0.23, t = -2.93, p = .004. Two separate 
regressions for the notice and no-notice conditions revealed a significant two-way interaction 






such interaction in the no-notice condition, b = 0.21, SE = 0.14, t = 1.50, p = .135. When the 
interaction term in the model was removed for the no-notice condition, participants did not differ 
in their confidence between Trials 4 and 5, b = 0.01, SE = 0.07, t = 0.11, p = .911, but reported 
significantly lower confidence in the inserted item than in the control item, b = -0.25, SE = 0.07, 
t = -3.39, p < .001. We next performed separate regressions for the effect of trial on inserted and 
control items in the notice condition. For inserted items, confidence was significantly lower on 
Trial 5 than Trial 4, b = -0.56, SE = 0.18, t = -3.18, p = .003. No significant difference was 
revealed for control items, b = -0.07, SE = 0.08, t = -0.94, p = .350.  
Table 4 
Experiment 2: Proportions of Confidence Ratings (1, 2, 3, or 4) for Control and Inserted Items 
on the Last Trial (Trial 5) Across the Notice and No-notice Reliability Conditions  
  Rating 
Condition Item 1 2 3 4 
Notice 
Control  0.00 0.07 0.08 0.85 
Inserted 0.18 0.18 0.06 0.58 
No-notice 
Control 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.89 
Inserted 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.83 
 
Post-task questionnaire 
For means across the Post-Trial 4 notification question and Post-task Questions 1 
(strategy; 0: completely external - 5: completely internal), 2 (think inserted; 0: no; 1: yes), and 3 
(guess accuracy; 0: incorrect guess; 1: correct guess), see Table 3.  
To assess whether the notification manipulation influenced self-reported strategy at 
retrieval, an exploratory Welch t-test was conducted. Recognition strategy at retrieval did not 
differ across the no-notification condition (M = 3.84, SD = 1.12) and the notification condition 






homogeneity of variance assumptions were violated (p’s < .05), a non-parametric test (Mann-
Whitney-Wilcoxon Test) was also conducted and revealed similar results, W = 3450, p = .400. 
We also compared (again exploratory) responses across the no-notice and notice conditions for 
whether participants believed we had inserted an item on Trial 5, and their accuracy at guessing 
the inserted item on Trial 5, using separate Chi-squared tests with a continuity correction. There 
was a statistically significant difference in the belief of insertion across conditions, χ2(1) = 8.08, 
p = .004, such that those in the notice condition more often reported believing that a word was 
inserted on Trial 5. There was no difference in the accuracy of guessing the inserted item on 
Trial 5 across conditions, χ2(1) = 3.60, p = .058. 
Next, in a series of regressions, we used individuals’ reported strategy at retrieval on Trial 
5 as a predictor of whether they recalled the inserted item on Trial 5 (using logistic regression), 
their confidence for the inserted item on Trial 5 (using linear regression), whether they thought a 
word had been inserted on Trial 5 (using logistic regression), and whether they correctly selected 
the inserted word for Trial 5 when asked (using logistic regression).  
Participants reporting a more external strategy were (i) more likely to recall the inserted 
item (foil) than were those reporting a more internal strategy, b = 0.75, SE = 0.19, z = 3.89, p < 
.001, (ii) more likely to have a higher confidence rating for the inserted item when recalled, b = 
0.35, SE = 0.12, t = 2.88, p = .005, (iii) less likely to report that a word was inserted, b = -0.57, 
SE = 0.20, z = -2.91, p = .003, and (iv) lower in their accuracy at guessing the inserted word, b = 
-0.43, SE = 0.17, z = -2.49, p = .013. It is important to note that within Trial 5, only those that 
recalled the inserted item and had a subsequent confidence rating (46/80 participants in the no-
notice condition, and 33/80 participants in the notice condition) were included in the linear 






to the four regressions listed above, but with both condition and a condition by recall strategy 
interaction as additional predictors (with recall strategy), revealed no interaction for any of the 
four regressions listed above (recall of inserted item, confidence in inserted item, reporting a 
word was inserted, accurately guessing the inserted word). 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 extends the main result of Experiment 1 to a modified recall test. That is, 
receiving notice that an external memory store was potentially unreliable reduced individuals’ 
susceptibility to the acceptance of manipulated information in their external store. Consistent 
with Experiment 1, participants often failed to notice a word inserted into their external memory 
stores. Indeed, across conditions on Trial 4, a majority of participants (65% in the no-notice 
condition, 78% in the notice condition) recalled the inserted word and were confident that it had 
been previously presented (3.46/4 in the no-notice condition, 3.52/4 in notice condition). 
Critically, for those given notice of the previous manipulation, recall and confidence decreased 
significantly on Trial 5, such that 41% of participants recalled the inserted item and with reduced 
confidence when they did (3.03/4). While recall of the inserted item decreased after the 
notification of the insertion, still almost half of the participants failed to detect the insertion (41% 
recall the inserted word).  
Consistent with Experiment 1, the notice between Trials 4 and 5 appeared to have no 
substantive effect on the endorsement and confidence rating of the control item (i.e., an actually 
presented item). This suggests that any effect of the notice was primarily to increase individuals’ 
abilities to discern actually presented target/control items from the inserted item (i.e., the foil). In 
the no-notice condition, there was a small general reduction in items recalled from Trial 4 to 






control than inserted items. This suggests that when given no notice of the manipulation, 
participants do not subsequently show an increased ability to discriminate between control and 
inserted items, but instead show evidence of overall reduced trust (or general skepticism) in the 
store. It is unclear, at this point, what the cause of that effect might be, though it is important to 
note that while individuals in the no-notice condition were never told of the manipulation on 
Trial 4, a word was nevertheless inserted.  
The strategy report results demonstrated that self-reported reliance on the external 
memory store at retrieval was related to more recall of the inserted item, higher confidence in the 
inserted item, lower likelihood of thinking that a word was inserted, and lower accuracy in 
guessing the inserted item. Each of these results is consistent with the notion that higher self-
reported reliance on one’s internal/biological memory during retrieval leads to less susceptibility 
to manipulation of their external store. Interestingly, while those that were notified of the 
previous insertion were less likely to endorse the inserted item, there was no evidence via the 
self-reports that they relied less on the external store during retrieval.  
Experiment 3 
As suggested in the introduction (see also Risko et al., 2019), one reason that individuals 
might be susceptible to the manipulation of their external memory stores is that, when using such 
a store, they initially encode information poorly (Kelly & Risko 2019a; 2019b; Lu et al., 2020) 
and/or believe that they did. This poor encoding might lead to a memory experience when 
retrieving information from the external store that is insufficient to detect the manipulation (i.e., 
one cannot tell the poorly encoded information that was actually presented from the inserted 
information). This kind of mechanism may provide one route through which the reliability 






external store is unreliable, they may not offload the memories (i.e., forego storing them 
internally) to their external store (see Storm & Stone, 2015) and, instead, might encode the 
information more strongly into internal memory, leading to an increase in their ability to detect 
the manipulation. 
To examine the link between encoding and susceptibility to external memory store 
manipulation, in Experiment 3 (pre-registered at https://osf.io/5uayq/) we manipulated 
individual’s expectation that they could rely on an external store during a future recall test. When 
participants are told not to expect access to their external memory store at recall, they recall more 
than when they are told to expect to have access to that store. Kelly and Risko (2019a; 2019b) 
argued that this offloading cost was due to a disengagement of effortful memorization of the list 
of to-be-remembered words when individuals believe they can rely on their external store. In 
Experiment 3, for the first three trials of the task, participants were given to-be-remembered 
words to type into a saved list and had access to this saved list to aid in recall. On the last trial, 
half of the participants were told that they would not have access to their saved list at recall and 
the other half were told to expect access to their saved list. Critically, everyone received access 
to their list at recall which included an inserted item (as in Experiments 1 and 2). Again, the main 
dependent variable of interest is the extent to which individuals recall the inserted item across 
these two conditions. If devoting more effort to encoding can decrease susceptibility to 
manipulation of the external store, then participants who do not expect access to their list at 
recall should be better able to detect an inserted item. Data and materials for Experiment 3 are 









The 160 participants included in the study were recruited online (during the Covid-19 
pandemic) using Prolific and completed the study within one hour for £3.75. All participants 
were over the age of eighteen. 22 participants were replaced based on the same exclusion criteria 
used in Experiment 2.  
Materials  
The Stimuli, Post-task questionnaire, and Debriefing questionnaire used were the same as 
in Experiments 1 and 2. The Confidence measure used was the same as in Experiment 2.  
Procedure 
The first three trials of the experiment were the same as Experiment 2. Once participants 
completed the recall test for Trial 3, participants in the warned condition were told that they 
would not receive their next typed list at recall. Participants in the not-warned condition were 
told that, like the other trials, they would receive their next typed list at recall. On the fourth trial, 
everyone was presented with their typed list at recall, and it was presented with the inserted word 
halfway into their list, undisclosed to participants. Participants subsequently answered Questions 
1, 2, and 3 from the Post-task questionnaire, completed the debriefing questionnaire, and were 
debriefed on the true purpose of the study and the reason for deception. 
Results 
Descriptive data from Experiment 3 are available in Table 5. Average confidence ratings 
reported are only for items that were recalled. The single control item compared to the single 





















Control confidence 3.51 (0.97) 3.88 (0.52) 3.91 (0.45) 3.89 (0.42) 
Inserted confidence - - - 3.42 (1.06) 
Control recall 0.83 (0.37) 0.91 (0.28) 0.91 (0.28) 0.94 (0.24) 
Inserted recall - - - 0.66 (0.48) 
Strategy - - - 2.19 
Think inserted - - - 0.58 







Control confidence 3.51 (1.00) 3.83 (0.60) 3.87 (0.47) 3.92 (0.36) 
Inserted confidence - - - 3.06 (1.19) 
Control recall 0.81 (0.39) 0.87 (0.33) 0.87 (0.34) 0.91 (0.28) 
Inserted recall - - - 0.44 (0.50) 
Strategy - - - 2.73 
Think inserted - - - 0.66 
Guess accuracy - - - 0.75 
Note. Dependent variables (Confidence, Recall, Post-task question answers 1-3; Strategy, Think 
inserted, Guess accuracy) are reported across the various conditions in Experiment 3. For Trials 
1-3, the control confidence and recall are mean values for all encoded items. For Trial 4, the 
control confidence and recall are means of the one control item. 
Recall  
The mean proportions of items recalled as a function of warning condition (no-warning 
vs. warning) and item type (control vs. inserted) are presented in Figure 3. A mixed effects 
logistic regression with the predictors condition (no-warning and warning) and item type 
(inserted vs. control) revealed a two-way interaction between condition and item type, b = -7.91, 
SE = 1.35, z = -5.85, p < .001. We next performed separate regressions on the inserted and 
control items, which were both logistic regressions since there was no within-subject factor. For 






warning condition, b = -0.93, SE = 0.33, z = -2.83, p = .005. No significant difference was 
revealed for control items, b = -0.36, SE = 0.61, z = -0.60, p = .550.  
Figure 3 
Experiment 3: Mean Percentage of Recall for Control and Inserted Items across Both Warning 
Conditions 
 
Note. Error bars are bias-corrected accelerated bootstrap 95% confidence intervals using 10,000 
replications. 
Confidence  
In Table 6, the confidence scale is presented with the proportion of participants reporting 
each rating (1, 2, 3, or 4) for the inserted and control items in the last trial (Trial 4). For the 
following analyses, confidence was treated as a continuous variable. A mixed effects regression 
including warning condition (no-warning vs. warning) and item type (inserted vs. control), did 
not reveal a two-way interaction between condition and item type, b = -0.37, SE = 0.19, t = -1.92, 
p = .055. When the interaction term in the model was removed, participants were not 






-1.02, p = .309, but were significantly more likely to report lower confidence in the inserted than 
control item, b = -0.64, SE = 0.10, t = -6.73, p < .001. 
Table 6 
Experiment 3: Proportions of Confidence Ratings (1, 2, 3, or 4) for Control and Inserted Items 
on the Last Trial (Trial 4) Across the No-warning and Warning Encoding Conditions 
  Rating 
Condition Item 1 2 3 4 
Warning 
Control 0 0.03 0.03 0.94 
Inserted 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.54 
No-warning 
Control 0 0.04 0.03 0.93 
Inserted 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.74 
 
Post-task questionnaire 
For means across the notification question and Post-task Questions 1 (strategy; 0: 
completely external - 5: completely internal), 2 (think inserted; 0: no; 1: yes), and 3 (guess 
accuracy; 0: incorrect guess; 1: correct guess), see Table 5.  
To assess whether the warning manipulation influenced self-reported strategy at retrieval, 
an exploratory Welch t-test was conducted (i.e., not preregistered). Recall strategy significantly 
differed across the warning condition (M = 2.73, SD = 1.09) and the no-warning condition (M = 
2.19, SD = 1.11), t(157.94) = 3.08, p = .002. Because the Shapiro-Wilk normality assumption 
was violated (p < .05), a non-parametric test (Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon Test) was also conducted 
and revealed the same result, W = 2317.5, p = .002. We also compared (again not preregistered) 
responses across the no-warning and warning conditions for whether participants believed we 
had inserted an item on Trial 4, and their accuracy at guessing the inserted item on Trial 4, using 
separate Chi-squared tests with a continuity correction. There was no difference in the belief of 






difference in the accuracy of guessing the inserted item on Trial 4 across conditions, χ2(1) = 
6.98, p = .008, such that those in the warning condition more often accurately guessed the 
inserted word on Trial 4. 
Next, in a series of pre-registered regressions, we used individuals’ reported strategy at 
retrieval on Trial 4 as a predictor of whether they recalled the inserted item on Trial 4 (using 
logistic regression), their confidence for the inserted item on Trial 4 (using linear regression), 
whether they thought a word had been inserted on Trial 4 (using logistic regression), and whether 
they correctly selected the inserted word for Trial 4 when asked (using logistic regression).  
Participants who reported a more external strategy were more likely to recall the inserted 
item than were those reporting a more internal strategy, b = -0.63, SE = 0.16, z = -3.91, p < .001, 
and had lower accuracy in guessing the inserted word, b = 0.36, SE = 0.16, z = -2.31, p = .021. 
Recall strategy was not a significant predictor of confidence rating for the inserted item, b = -
0.20, SE = 0.12, t = -1.67, p = .098, or for reporting that a word was inserted, b = 0.28, SE = 
0.15, z = 1.83, p = .067. It is important to note that within Trial 4, only those that recalled the 
inserted item and had a subsequent confidence rating (53/80 participants in the no-warning 
condition, and 35/80 participants in the warning condition) were included in the linear regression 
for confidence rating. Exploratory (not preregistered) regression analyses analogous to the four 
regressions listed above, but with both condition and a condition by recall strategy interaction as 
additional predictors (with recall strategy), revealed no interaction for any of the four regressions 
listed above with the following dependent variables: recall of inserted item, confidence in 







Experiment 3 assessed whether expecting access to one’s external memory store 
influences susceptibility to a manipulation of that store when the memory test is recall. 
Consistent with Experiments 1 and 2, participants often failed to notice a word inserted into their 
external memory stores. Indeed, a large percentage of participants (66% in the no-warning 
condition) recalled the inserted word and were confident that it had been previously presented 
(3.42/4 in the no-warning condition). The novel observation in Experiment 3 was that when 
participants were told that they would not have access to their external store, recall and 
confidence in the inserted word lessened, such that only 44% recalled the inserted item and with 
less confidence (3.06/4) than in the no-warning condition. This result is consistent with the idea 
that investing more effort during encoding (because individuals believed they could not rely on 
an external store) can protect one against manipulation of one’s external memory store (when, in 
this case, it becomes unexpectedly available).  This might be because better encoded items are 
more easily discriminated from the inserted item and/or more effort at encoding leads to a greater 
expectation that items feel familiar at retrieval. Another interesting possibility is that the surprise 
availability of their list made individuals who were warned that they would not have their list 
more skeptical and thus more willing to accept that the experimenter might have manipulated 
their list. The encoding manipulation appeared to have no substantive effect on the control item, 
suggesting that any effect of the manipulation was primarily to increase individuals’ ability to 
discern actually presented target/control items from the inserted item (i.e., the foil). The 
participants’ self-reports demonstrated that on average, individuals in the no-warning condition 






recall test and that self-reported reliance on the external memory store was related to more recall 
of the inserted item and lower accuracy in guessing the inserted item.  
General Discussion 
 Using external aids to offload cognitive demands has long been a memorial strategy 
allowing us to evade the limitations of our internal/biological memory (Clark, 2010a; Donald, 
1991; Nestojko et al., 2013; Risko & Gilbert, 2016). There are costs, however, to allocating 
memory demands to external locations. Here we focused on one such cost, originally reported by 
Risko and colleagues (2019), that individuals are susceptible to manipulation of their external 
memory stores. In the present investigation, we again found that a large percentage of 
participants did not notice a manipulation of their external memory store. However, we also 
discovered two manipulations that reliably influenced one’s susceptibility to such manipulation: 
first, when individuals were given explicit notification that we had previously manipulated their 
external memory store, and second, when we told participants not to expect access to their 
external store at recall. In both situations, individuals were better able to detect a manipulation of 
their external memory store. In addition, neither of these manipulations appeared to compromise 
how participants endorsed the original (i.e., legitimate, not inserted) contents. Still, even with an 
explicit notification of an insertion or a presumably better encoded list of words (because they 
did not expect access to their external memory store), many participants (i.e., > 40%) remained 
unable to discriminate target words from words inserted into their external memory stores.  
Each participant also provided a self-report rating of their reliance on their internal 
memory versus external memory store at retrieval. If participants were to rely on their internal 
memory, then one could imagine that they would be better equipped to not endorse the inserted 






of one’s susceptibility to the manipulation of their external store reported here seems consistent 
with this idea. That is, in Experiments 2 and 3, reported strategy at retrieval was a significant 
predictor of endorsement of the inserted item and accurately guessing the inserted word (these 
effects were in the same direction but not significant in Experiment 1, which had a smaller 
sample and used recognition instead of recall as the test). Thus, those who self-report being more 
reliant on their internal stores were less susceptible to manipulation of their external stores. 
Interestingly, strategy at retrieval did not differ across the reliability conditions in Experiment 2 
but did differ across the expected access conditions in Experiment 3. This result might suggest 
that the two manipulations are reducing susceptibility to external storage manipulation via 
different mechanisms. 
While the self-reported strategy at retrieval data are interesting, it is important to note that 
individuals may not be able to accurately assess the extent to which they relied on their internal 
versus external stores. In addition, given that the self-report questions followed the retrieval 
phase, participants’ retrieval performance (e.g., last trial) could have influenced their answers to 
these questions. For example, participants may have successfully detected the inserted item and 
because of this, reported relying on their internal memory or vice versa. An alternative approach 
to indexing individual differences in reliance on an external store by self-report could involve 
more indirect methods (e.g., pupil dilation during encoding).  
Routes to Reliability  
The manipulation of reliability in the reported experiments is one of the few ways in 
which reliability has been manipulated in the literature thus far (Storm & Stone, 2015; Weis & 
Weise, 2019). Despite the differences in how the manipulations were implemented, the effects on 






decreased susceptibility to external store manipulation). Nonetheless, it is clear that one can 
come to not trust an external store to perform a cognitive task in different ways. It will be 
interesting in future research to compare these different types of violations of trust or reliability 
manipulations directly. 
Understanding Endorsement When Memory is Distributed: A Metacognitive Approach  
Regardless of whether a memory is stored internally or externally, upon retrieval of that 
memory, participants must decide whether to endorse it or not (Arango-Muñoz, 2013). One 
approach to understanding this problem is in the context of metacognitive monitoring and 
control. For example, as noted in the Introduction, Koriat and Goldsmith’s (1996) schematic 
model of free report memory performance captures a similar problem to that facing participants 
here. In their model, monitoring processes produce a subjective sense of the correctness of a 
retrieved candidate answer (i.e., the assessed probability). This output is then compared to a 
response threshold that is influenced by information regarding situational demands and 
incentives, in order to come to a decision about whether to report the candidate answer.  
How might one extend this kind of model to the endorsement problem and, more 
generally, to contexts wherein individuals’ “memory” is distributed across internal and external 
spaces? As a first pass, an item inserted into an external store could be thought to yield little 
evidence from a monitoring process that the item was previously presented. For example, there is 
little reason to expect that the inserted items would feel familiar. Nevertheless, the inserted items 
are often endorsed. In Koriat and Goldsmith’s (1996) framework, this might reflect the control 
mechanism enacting a low threshold, given the situational demands are such that the inserted 
item is present in what has proven to be a reliable external store. From this perspective, a 






threshold. As long as this threshold is not raised too high and/or the assessed probability output 
from the monitoring process is high for most control items, this should lead to a decrease in 
reports of the inserted item without much of an effect on control items. The influence of the 
expectation of access to the external store, putatively encoding effort, could arguably have a 
similar effect. That is, following encoding items deeply, one might adopt a higher threshold for 
accepting items as legitimate.  
A different perspective is that the reliability manipulation and/or expectation of access 
manipulation influences the output of the monitoring process as opposed to the response 
threshold. As detailed previously, better encoding would serve to improve memory for the 
control (actually presented) items. This could enhance the experienced difference between the 
inserted item and the control items, thus improving detection performance. Returning to Koriat 
and Goldsmith’s (1996) framework, this would require that the monitoring process be able to 
consider information that would capture this difference (e.g., relative familiarity). A related idea 
would be that improved encoding of control items leads to the retrieval of information that 
decreases the assessed probability that the inserted item had been presented. For example, the 
inserted item here is placed in between items that would have originally been presented in 
sequence. Thus, the assessed probability that an item was legitimate might be exceptionally low 
if participants recollect studying two items in sequence that now have an additional unfamiliar 
item between them. Placing the influence of the reliability and expectation of access 
manipulations in the monitoring mechanism, this leaves open the question of how an item’s 
presence in an external store influences the decision to endorse the inserted item. From this 
perspective, all items that appear in an external store might receive a kind of “boost” to the 






 Of course, these described means of grounding the present findings within a monitoring 
and control framework are not mutually exclusive. Furthermore, the influence of each of the 
manipulations used here might well affect different parts of such a model. Tentative evidence 
that this might be the case is available in the different effects that the manipulations had on 
strategy reports (i.e., the reliability manipulation did not influence retrieval strategy whereas the 
expected access manipulation did). Future work aimed at further refining our understanding of 
how individuals approach solving the endorsement problem from this perspective would be 
valuable. 
Conclusion 
Offloading memory to external stores is a critical strategy allowing us to evade the 
limitations of our internal memory. One cost of this approach is that it potentially exposes our 
“memories” to manipulation, provided that they reside out in the proverbial open. The present 
research reinforces this idea, as most participants failed to notice a manipulation of their external 
store, and also demonstrates that an explicit notification of either a previous manipulation or 
inaccessibility of our external memory store can decrease this susceptibility. In a technologically 
advanced age, in which a large amount of to-be-remembered information is externally stored, 
understanding the associated risks (in addition to associated benefits) is crucial to using our 






Chapter 2: Modeling Reliability 
In the previous chapter, I proposed various mechanisms that might explain the patterns 
observed. In the present chapter, I implement a simple model of the endorsement of items in a 
distributed memory context (i.e., when individuals have an external memory store available) and 
examine each of these proposed mechanisms in the context of the experimental manipulations 
used in the previous chapter focusing on the recall experiments (i.e., Experiments 2 and 3).  The 
critical pattern across the reported experiments is that the control items are endorsed to a high 
degree (.88 and .94 in Experiments 2 and 3), whereas the typical inserted item is endorsed to a 
lesser but still substantial extent (.58 and .66 in Experiments 2 and 3). The inserted items become 
even less likely to be endorsed when participants are warned of a previous manipulation of their 
list or future inaccessibility of their list (.41 and .44 in Experiments 2 and 3). The latter two 
manipulations do not appear to influence the endorsement of control items (.90 and .91 in 
Experiments 2 and 3).  
General structure 
The basic structure of the model is based on Goldsmith and Koriat’s (1999) verbal model 
of how metamemory processes regulate memory reports in a free recall task. This model was 
proposed to explain how individuals decide, for a candidate answer retrieved from memory 
whether to report it to withhold it. In the experiments presented in the previous chapter, 
participants similarly decided to report or not report a retrieved word, in this case whether that 
word is present in an external memory store the participant has available to them. In their model, 
a monitoring mechanism assesses the correctness of potential memory responses (assessed 
probability; Pa), and a control mechanism operates on the output of the monitoring mechanism to 






as the response criterion (Prc). If the Pa for a given word is equal to or greater than the Prc, then 
the word is reported.  
Figure 4 contains the basic model. As in the reported experiments, I focus on responses to 
both control items (i.e., items that were presented) and inserted items (i.e., items that were not 
presented but were inserted into the participant’s external store). In my model, Pa depends on the 
item’s presence in the external store (i.e., present vs. absent) and its familiarity. Familiarity has 
been described as the experience associated with having previously encountered an item or 
“knowing” that an item was presented (Whittlesea & Williams, 2000; Tulving, 1985; Gardiner, 
1988). In a later model (Simulation 5), the judgment will also incorporate a kind of recollective 
experience as well as familiarity, somewhat akin to the dual-process model of recollection 
(Yonelinas, 1994). Here, familiarity is a bounded continuous parameter that varies from 0 to 1. 
Familiarity of the inserted item is assumed to be low, provided the item was not presented in the 
encoding phase, and the control item is assumed to be higher, provided it was presented. At 
retrieval, both the control item and the inserted item are present in the external store and 
consequently both receive the same value of 1 (or “present”) for that discrete parameter in the 
model.  
Taken together, the model contains both an external contribution (i.e., the item’s presence 
in the external memory store) and an internal contribution (i.e., the experience of familiarity 
when individuals encounter the item in the external store). Considering that there exist two 
sources of information on which Pa is based, I weighted those contributions to yield a single Pa 
value. Here I assume that individuals, given their experience with their external store during the 
experiment (and possibly outside the experiment), rely more heavily on the fact that the item 






requisite assumption given both previous work (Risko et al., 2019) and the work reported here, 
regarding individual’s tendency to endorse items inserted into their external memory stores at 
high but not ceiling rates. Thus, in modelling endorsement of both the inserted and control items, 
I assume that the participant considers both their internal feeling of familiarity for the item and 
the fact that the item is present in their typed list (i.e., external store), weighting the latter more 
than the former. In the following simulations, I simulated 80 participants per condition and 1000 
experiments.  
Figure 4  
Basic Schematic Model of the Memory Report and its Proposed Inputs 
Simulation 1 
I first wanted to confirm that this basic model can capture the general pattern of results 
when individuals have an item inserted into their external memory stores. Parameters were 
selected to capture the general pattern (i.e., high endorsement of the control item and lower but 
nevertheless high endorsement of the inserted item). In Model 1, the familiarity of the inserted 
item is determined for each simulated participant by a random draw from a normal distribution 
with a mean (M) = 0 and a standard deviation (SD) = .10. The familiarity of the control item is 
randomly drawn from a normal distribution with a M = .50 and SD = .10. The participant’s Pa 
weights the item’s presence in store (which is always a value of 1) at .75, and an item’s 






distribution with a M = .73 and SD = .10 for each participant in both conditions. The values 
drawn from the normal distributions are selected to be bound between 0 and 1. When Pa ≥ Prc, 
individuals endorse the item as having been presented previously.  
This model produced high endorsement of control items (M = .92, SD = .03) and lower, 
but still relatively high, endorsement of the inserted items (M = .62, SD = .05). The means 
approximate the combined means from Experiments 2 and 3. Next, I attempted to simulate the 
influence of the manipulations reported in Experiments 1-3 while keeping the structure and basic 
parameters constant. That is, when warned of a previous manipulation of their list or future 
inaccessibility of their list, endorsement of the inserted items decreases (i.e., to around 42%) 
while endorsement of the control items is generally unaffected. In each simulation, the basic 
strategy involves exploring the implementation of one particular change to the model that could 
have been produced by one or both of the manipulations. I refer generically to the manipulations 
as the “warning” manipulation. The particular changes implemented are not mutually exclusive 
and it is possible that one manipulation primarily has its effect via one particular mechanism and 
the other through another. Alternatively, both might operate similarly. Importantly, both appear 
to have the same qualitative effect, in that they influence inserted endorsement but not control 
endorsement. 
Simulation 2 
In Model 2, I examined whether a shift in the Prc could account for the influence of the 
manipulations on endorsement. From this perspective, telling participants that their store has 
been previously manipulated, or misinforming them about the availability of their store at 
retrieval, leads participants to adopt a stricter criterion for endorsing items. To simulate this, the 






throughout, I simulated various “strengths” of the influence of the manipulation on the 
parameters to provide a clearer demonstration of how that parameter change influences the 
behaviour of the model. For example, here I simulated a change in Prc from .75 to .79 in 
increments of .02 for the warning condition (Table 7) and keep the Prc for the no-warning 
condition as in Simulation 1. The remainder of the parameters stayed the same as in Simulation 
1.  
Results. As can be seen in Table 7, increasing the Prc in the warning condition decreases 
the endorsement of the inserted item. For example, when the Prc was increased from the original 
value of .73 to .75, endorsement of the inserted items decreased from .62 to .54 and when it was 
further increased to .85, endorsement decreased to .19. While a reduction in endorsement of the 
inserted item matches the influence of the manipulations, increasing Prc also decreased control 
endorsement (see Table 7). For example, when the Prc was increased from the original value of 
.73 to .75, endorsement of the control item decreased from .92 to .89, and when it was further 
increased to .85, endorsement decreased to .60. That said, the rate that endorsement decreased 
was indeed greater for inserted items than for control items. As a reminder, the manipulations in 
Experiments 2 and 3 reduced endorsement of the inserted item to .41 and .44 respectively. 
Approximating this rate of endorsement in this model (.46 - .38 when Prc in the warning 
condition is set to .77 and .79 respectively) would result in a decrease in control endorsement to 
about .85 - .80. As noted above, the manipulations in Experiments 2 and 3 had no discernible 
effect on control item endorsement. Taken together, this simulation suggests that a shift in Prc 
might not be how the manipulation of notifying participants of a previous insertion or 








Varying Values of the Prc for the Warning Condition and Subsequent Recall Values for All Items 
   Prc in the warning condition 




Control .92 (.03) .92 (.03) .92 (.03) .92 (.03) .92 (.03) .92 (.03) 
Inserted .62 (.05) .62 (.05) .62 (.05) .62 (.05) .62 (.06) .61 (.06) 
Warning 
Control .89 (.03) .85 (.04) .80 (.04) .74 (.05) .67 (.05) .60 (.05) 
Inserted .54 (.06) .46 (.06) .38 (.05) .31 (.05) .24 (.05) .19 (.04) 
Note. The Prc in the no-warning condition is set at .73.  
Simulation 3 
In Model 3, I examined whether a shift in the weighting of an item’s presence in the store 
(i.e., the external contribution) and familiarity (i.e., the internal contribution) in calculating Pa 
can account for the pattern of results. From this perspective, telling participants that their store 
has been previously manipulated, or misinforming them about the availability of their store at 
retrieval, leads participants to put less weight on their external memory store and more on their 
internal feeling of familiarity. In this model, an item’s presence in the store is always weighted 
more than familiarity but is weighted slightly less in the warning condition compared to the no-
warning condition. Here, I simulated a change in presence in store weighting (from .71 to .66) 
and familiarity weighting (from .29 to .34) for the warning condition (Table 8) and kept the 
weighting for the no-warning condition as in Simulation 1. The remainder of the parameters 
stayed the same as in Simulation 1.  
 Results. As can be seen in Table 8, decreasing the weight of an item’s presence in the 
store while increasing the weight of an item’s familiarity in the warning condition reduced 
endorsement of the inserted item. For example, when presence in the store and familiarity shifted 
from the original weighting of .75 and .25 to .73 and .27 respectively, endorsement of the 
inserted item decreased to .54, and when the weighting was shifted further to .63 and .27, 






influence of the manipulations, shifting the weighting of an item’s presence in the store and 
familiarity also decreased control endorsement (see Table 8). For example, when presence in the 
store and familiarity shifted from the original weighting of .75 and .25 to .73 and .27 
respectively, endorsement of the inserted item decreased to .90, and when the weighting was 
further shifted to .63 and .27, endorsement decreased to .79. That said, as in the previous 
simulation, the rate that endorsement decreased was greater for inserted items than for control 
items. The manipulations in Experiments 2 and 3 reduced endorsement of the inserted item to .41 
and .44 respectively, and approximating this rate of endorsement in this model (.39 when 
presence in the store and familiarity is weighted at .69 and .31 respectively) would result in a 
decrease in control endorsement to .86. As noted above, the manipulations in Experiments 2 and 
3 had no discernible effect on control item endorsement. Taken together, this simulation suggests 
that decreasing the weight placed on presence in the store (and increasing the weight on 
familiarity) might not be how the manipulation influences behaviour. Again, the issue is that the 
manipulation reduces endorsement of the control items more than what appears to be the case in 
the data. 
Table 8 
Varying Values of the Weight Given to the Presence of the Store and Familiarity of Items in the 
Warning Condition and Subsequent Recall Values for All Items 
   Warning condition Pa weighting (presence in store, familiarity) 
 Condition Item .73, .27 .71, .29 .69, .31 .67, .33 .65, .35 .63, .37 
Recall 
No-warning 
Control .92 (.03) .92 (.03) .92 (.03) .92 (.03) .92 (.03) .92 (.03) 
Inserted .62 (.05) .62 (.05) .62 (.06) .62 (.05) .62 (.05) .62 (.05) 
Warning 
Control .90 (.03) .88 (.04) .86 (.04) .84 (.04) .82 (.04) .79 (.05) 
Inserted .54 (.05) .47 (.05) .39 (.05) .32 (.05) .30 (.05) .20 (.05) 
Note. The Pa weighting in the no-warning condition is set at .75 for an item’s presence in the 







In Model 4, I examined whether an increase in familiarity for control items in the 
warning condition can account for the pattern of results. From this perspective, telling 
participants that their store has been previously manipulated, or misinforming them about the 
availability of their store at retrieval, leads participants to encode the items into memory more 
effortfully during study, leading to a stronger familiarity signal at retrieval. Here, I simulated an 
increase in familiarity for the control items in the warning condition (from .55 to .90) compared 
to the no-warning condition (.50). The control items were the only items that were presented thus 
the manipulation could not affect the inserted item’s familiarity. Table 9 shows the familiarity 
parameter shifted by .5 as opposed to .2 in the previous simulations to account for the small 
changes in endorsement when manipulating the familiarity value. The remainder of the 
parameters stayed the same as in Simulation 1. 
Results. As can be seen in Table 9, increasing the familiarity of the control item in the 
warning condition increased endorsement of only the control item in the warning condition. The 
inserted item’s endorsement remained the same. This pattern, of course, is not consistent with the 
data reported in Chapter 1. This pattern indicates that the influence of the manipulations, if it is 
one of encoding strength at study, needs to include a means by which this increase in encoding 
strength can also influence inserted items which are not present at study. The next simulation 








Varying Values of Familiarity in the Warning Condition and Subsequent Recall Values for All 
Items 
Note. The control familiarity in the no-warning condition is set at .50. 
Simulation 5 
In Model 5 (shown in Figure 5), I examined whether the likelihood of experiencing a 
kind of internal recollective experience might account for the pattern of results. In the previous 
models, the central parameters were an item’s presence in the store, the internal feeling of 
familiarity for the item, the weighting of each to yield the Pa value, and the Prc. Here, I added an 
additional parameter meant to reflect the probability that the participant’s recollective experience 
of the presented (i.e., control) items (or item) allows them to reject the inserted item. This might 
reflect a kind of recall to reject, wherein the successful recall of an item allows participants to 
correctly reject similar foils (Rotello & Heit, 2000). For example, if the list contained the word 
TABLE followed by COMPUTER and we insert the word HOME between TABLE and 
COMPUTER in a participant’s external memory store, an individual recalling the fact that 
COMPUTER followed TABLE could reject the inserted item while endorsing the control item 
TABLE. Telling participants that their store has been previously manipulated or misinforming 
them about the availability of their store at retrieval (as we did in Experiments 2 and 3) could be 
seen as increasing the probability that such a recollective event occurs. The latter would reflect 
the assumption that participants may have put more effort into encoding after being told that 
   Control familiarity in the warning condition 
 Condition Item .55 .60 .65 .70 .75 .80 
Recall 
No-warning 
Control .92 (.03) .92 (.03) .92 (.03) .92 (.03) .92 (.03) .92 (.03) 
Inserted .62 (.05) .62 (.05) .62 (.05) .62 (.05) .62 (.05) .62 (.03) 
Warning 
Control .94 (.03) .95 (.02) .96 (.02) .97 (.05) .98 (.02) .98 (.01) 






their store was previously manipulated or telling them that they would not have access to their 
store at retrieval. From this perspective, the manipulation leads to more effort at encoding and, 
thus, to a higher possibility of experiencing a recollection that allows participants to both reject 
the inserted item and endorse the control item. This kind of mechanism, in principle, addresses 
limitations of earlier models wherein the manipulation decreased endorsement of both control 
(i.e., a miss) and inserted (i.e., a correct rejection) items. 
First, given the added parameter (i.e., experiencing the recollective event described above 
or not), I tried to simulate the basic pattern (i.e., control items endorsed to a higher degree than 
inserted items, but both endorsed at a high rate). The new parameter worked by setting a value of 
0 (does not have a recollective experience) or 1 (did have a recollective experience) for a 
participant. If a participant does not have this particular recollective experience, then 
endorsement is calculated in the ordinary manner (Pa ≥ Prc). However, if a participant does have 
this particular recollective experience, then they endorse the control item and do not endorse the 








Schematic Model of the Memory Report in Model 5 and its Proposed Additional Input of a 
Recollective Experience 
 
In this simulation, the probability of a recollective experience for each participant is 
drawn from a binomial distribution with a probability of .05. To reiterate, in Experiments 2 and 
3, control items were endorsed to a high degree (.88 and .94 in Experiments 2 and 3) and the 
typical inserted item was endorsed to a lesser extent (.58 and .66 in Experiments 2 and 3). 
Similar to Simulation 1, the model produced high endorsement of control items (M = .92, SD = 
.03) and lower, but still relatively high, endorsement of the inserted items (M = .59, SD = .05).  
Next, I attempted to simulate the influence of the manipulations reported in Experiments 
2 and 3. Specifically, when participants are warned of a previous manipulation of their list or 
future inaccessibility of their list, endorsement of the inserted items decreases (i.e., to around 
42%) while endorsement of the control items is generally unaffected. To test whether a 






our final pattern of results, I set the probability of a recollective experience to remain at .05 in the 
no-warning condition and increased that probability in the warning condition from .10 to 35.  
Results. As can be seen in Table 10, increasing the likelihood of this particular type of 
recollective experience reduced endorsement of the inserted item. For example, when the 
probability of a recollective experience was set to .10, endorsement of the inserted item was .56 
and when it was further increased to .35, endorsement decreased to .40. Unlike the previous 
simulations, this decrease in endorsement of the inserted item was not associated with a decrease 
in control endorsement. Rather, control endorsement increased slightly. For example, when the 
probability of a recollective experience was set to .10, endorsement of the control item was .93, 
and when it was further increased to .35, endorsement slightly increased to .95. As noted above, 
the manipulations in Experiments 2 and 3 had no discernible effect on control item endorsement. 
Notably, when the recollective experience in the warning condition was set to .30, the 
endorsement of the control and inserted item in the warning condition provides a reasonable 
match to the pattern found in the data (.94 and .43 respectively), though there is a small increase 
in control endorsement. Overall, manipulating the probability that individuals would experience 
a recollective event that allows them to endorse the control and reject the inserted item produced 








Varying the Proportion of Recollective Experiences in the Warning Condition and the 
Subsequent Recall Values for All Items 
Note. The likelihood of a recollective experience in the no-warning condition is set to .05. 
Combining Mechanisms 
In each simulation thus far, one change to the model has been implemented at a time (i.e., 
increasing Prc, weighting an item’s presence in the store less and familiarity more, and 
increasing control item familiarity in the warning condition). Of course, the changes 
implemented are not mutually exclusive and it is possible that the manipulations have their effect 
via more than one mechanism. From this perspective, it is useful to consider that Models 2 
(increasing PRC) and 3 (increasing the weighting of familiarity relative to an item’s presence in 
the store) appeared to not fit the reported pattern well because they both reduced control 
endorsement while decreasing inserted endorsement, while Model 4 (increasing control item 
familiarity) increased control endorsement without an effect on inserted endorsement. This 
suggests that combining either a reduction in Prc or re-weighting with an increase in control 
memory strength could yield a pattern close to what we observed. For example, increasing 
control familiarity from .50 to .63 and increasing Prc from .73 to .78 yields high endorsement of 
the control items in the no-warning (.92) and warning (.89) conditions, lower endorsement of 
inserted items in the no-warning condition (.62) and an even lower endorsement of inserted items 
in the warning condition (.42)—a pattern that generally matches the results in our data, though 
   Probability of recollective experience in the warning condition 
 Condition Item .10 .15 .20 .25 .30 .35 
Recall 
No-warning 
Control .92 (.03) .92 (.03) .92 (.03) .92 (.03) .93 (.03) .93 (.03) 
Inserted .59 (.06) .59 (.06) .59 (.06) .58 (.05) .58 (.06) .58 (.06) 
Warning 
Control .93 (.03) .93 (.03) .94 (.03) .94 (.03) .94 (.03) .95 (.03) 






there is a small decrease in control endorsement. In a similar vein, increasing control familiarity 
from .50 to .63 and shifting the weight on an item’s presence in the store and familiarity from .75 
and .25 to .70 and .30 respectively yielded high endorsement of the control items in the no-
warning and warning conditions (.92 and .94 respectively), lower endorsement of inserted items 
in the no-warning condition (.62) and an even lower endorsement of inserted items in the 
warning condition (.43). Again, a pattern that generally matches the results in our data, though 
there is a small increase in control endorsement. Taken together, these simulations suggest that 
the combination of either a reduction in Prc or re-weighting with an increase in control 
familiarity represents another potential means of capturing the empirical patterns reported. 
Discussion 
In the present chapter, various parameters in a simple model of endorsement in a 
distributed memory context were explored to capture the patterns observed in Chapter 1. The 
basic model weighted an item’s presence in the external memory store and an internal feeling of 
familiarity to yield an assessed probability (Pa) of an item having been presented. This was 
compared to a threshold (Prc) to decide whether to endorse a given item. One of the models also 
included the likelihood of experiencing a kind of internal recollective experience for each item. 
After establishing the basic pattern in which control items were endorsed to a higher degree than 
inserted items, but both were endorsed at a high rate (Model 1), I manipulated various 
parameters to explore which (if any or a combination of two) captured the general pattern 
reported in Chapter 1 (i.e., reduced endorsement of inserted items in the warning condition). 
The results indicated that an increase in the Prc (Model 2) and less weighting of an item’s 
presence in the store coupled with a higher weighting of familiarity (Model 3) yielded results not 






weighting external and internal information (Model 3) both yielded lower endorsement of the 
inserted items (as observed in the data), they also demonstrated a nontrivial decrease in control 
item endorsement, which is not consistent with the data. This pattern makes clear the importance 
of the influence of our manipulations on control item endorsement for adjudicating between 
competing accounts. Future empirical work could explore stronger manipulations aimed at 
reducing inserted endorsement even further to determine whether control endorsement will also 
decrease.  
In Models 4 and 5, I simulated what might happen if the manipulations led to increases in 
encoding strength. In Model 4, this consisted of an increase in familiarity for the control item, 
which led only to an increase in endorsement of control items and did not capture the pattern 
reported in Experiments 2 and 3. In Model 5, an increase in encoding strength consisted of 
increasing the likelihood of a kind of recollective experience that would allow participants to 
endorse the control item and concurrently reject the inserted item. Increasing the likelihood of 
such a recollective experience yielded reduced endorsement for the inserted items with a small 
increase in control item endorsement. The contrast between Models 4 and 5 is instructive in 
exploring how an increase in encoding strength might influence behaviour. That is, if an increase 
in encoding strength underlies how the manipulations influence behavior, then there needs to be 
a means by which that encoding strength influences the inserted item. This is challenging, 
provided the inserted item is not presented at encoding. Model 5 provides one potential solution 
to this challenge. 
The last models explored whether a combination of mechanisms might also provide a 
means of capturing the observed patterns. Increasing control item familiarity (which in Model 4 






weight on internal rather than external information (which in Models 2 and 3, respectively, 
slightly decreased control endorsement) yielded a pattern close to our results. However, slight 
decreases/increases in control item endorsement of the warning condition were still present.  
 Taken together, the present simulations provide an initial exploration of one 
implementation of a model aimed at capturing memory reports within a distributed memory 
context. The results provide useful guidance for both future empirical work and future modelling 
efforts. 
Conclusion 
Offloading memory is a strategy often used and allows us to evade the limitation of our 
internal memory, though an associated risk is that these memories stored externally may be 
susceptible to manipulation. Across three experiments in Chapter 1, most participants failed to 
notice a manipulation of their external store and an explicit notification (of a previous 
manipulation or the inaccessibility of the external memory store) decreased this susceptibility. In 
Chapter 2, a simple model of endorsement was explored through which I examined various 
proposed mechanisms (i.e., stricter criterion, higher familiarity of control items, more weight on 
familiarity, and a recollective experience) to explain the results observed in Chapter 1. The 
simulations provided an initial investigation of endorsement in a distributed memory context and 
provides guidance for experiments and modelling in the future.  
The presented research contributes to our understanding of the endorsement of 
information stored on external memory stores (e.g., on the Internet, online shared documents). 
This work highlights both our susceptibility to manipulation of information in our external stores 
and factors that might reduce our susceptibility to such manipulation (e.g., by cueing individuals 






be externally stored, understanding how to mitigate the associated risks (and utilize the 
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 Word lists of varying lengths (yoked inserted item bolded) 
 
 List 
 1 2 3 4 5 
1 shoulder carpet sweep highway exercise 
2 lunchtime seat gardener gasoline article 
3 tree venue river offer walkway 
4 colour territory trailer paperwork schoolyard 
5 judgment slush train amphibian reptile 
6 trashcan recombine percussion early point 
7 kale picnic rainfall gambling engaged 
8 home alligator seashore cabbage theatre 
9 freshness doors unseen rabbit sculpture 
10 stereo body clock chase beverage 
11 nerves campground frozen stone pencil 
12 carpenter neighbour rumour timing matrix 
13 computer dolphin grain sushi horse 
14 kidney desk drawing store mechanic 
15 vein camera sidewalk teen broccoli 
16 pickle liquid bean patio  
17 liver lawn filter squirrel  
18 keyboard obstacle stapler   
19 figure windy hidden   
20 couch stint    
21 soon centre    
22 atrium     
23 second     
